Not a NATO responsibility? Psychological warfare, the Berlin crisis, and the formation of Interdoc

This chapter examines a particular episode during the early 1960s that had profound implications for the non-military role of NATO and its identity as a defensive alliance.

Type:: Book Chapter
Published:: 2006
Publisher:: Routledge

This chapter examines a particular episode during the early 1960s that had profound implications for the non-military role of NATO and its identity as a defensive alliance. In 1960, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) submitted a proposal for the creation of a permanent civilian body within NATO to initiate and coordinate psychological warfare operations against the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (GDR).1 The background to this proposal was Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s attempt to force an ultimatum on the status of West Berlin. The FRG’s main concern was that it could be left out of a potential compromise solution brokered by the United States and Britain.

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What is "Not a NATO responsibility? Psychological warfare, the Berlin crisis, and the formation of Interdoc" about?: This chapter examines a particular episode during the early 1960s that had profound implications for the non-military role of NATO and its identity as a defensive alliance.